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John Patty

 

John Patty

Assistant Professor of Government
[ Curriculum Vitae ]
E-mail:
Phone:
Fax:
 jpatty@gov.harvard.edu
617-496-1724
617-495-0438
 CGIS N406
1737 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 4:00-5:00pm

Biographical Note:

John Patty is a formal political theorist, with interests encompassing behavioral models of decision making and political institutions. He regularly teaches "Strategic Models in Political Economy" (Government 1015) and a graduate noncooperative game theory course (Government 2005). In addition, he has taught courses on Congress, the bureaucracy, formal models in American politics, and computational modeling. His work has been published in American Journal of Political Science, Economics & Politics, Electoral Studies, Games & Economic Behavior, Journal of Politics, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, Public Choice, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and Social Choice & Welfare. His current work focuses on legislative procedure, models of rhetoric, the design of bureaucratic agencies, and the formal theory of voting and elections. Professor Patty received his Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the California Institute of Technology in 2001 and was Assistant Professor of Political Economy and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University from 2000-2005.

Papers:

A Theory of Voting in Large Elections (with Richard McKelvey) Forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 227-247
Slackers & Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise(with Sean Gailmard) American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.
Equilibrium Party Government Working Paper (2006)
Two’s Company, Three’s An Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections Working Paper (2006)
Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources & Venue Choice in Policy-Making (w/ S. Gailmard & F. Boehmke) Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2005) 139-169
Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization Social Choice and Welfare (2007) Forthcoming
Conditional Partisanship: Looking for Partisan Effects on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House Working Paper (2005)
The Behavioral Foundations of the Midterm Effect Working Paper (2005)
The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics Journal of Politics (2007), Forthcoming.
Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace (w/ Roberto Weber) Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 5(3):305-320
Letting the Good Times Roll: A Theory of Voter Inference and Experimental Evidence (w/Roberto Weber) Public Choice (2006), Forthcoming.
Incommensurability and Issue Voting Journal of Theoretical Politics (2006), Forthcoming.
Arguments-Based Collective Choice Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming.
The Politics of Biased Information Working Paper