

Curriculum Vitae
Kenneth A. Shepsle

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PERSONAL

Office Address: Institute for Quantitative Social Science (IQSS),
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EDUCATION

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1962-1966
B.A. in Mathematics, Political Science, 1966

University of Rochester, 1966-1969
Ph.D. in Political Science, 1970

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Academic

1998-99 Visiting Centennial Professor, London School of Economics
1997- George Dickson Markham Professor of Government, Harvard University
1986- Professor of Government, Harvard University
1984-86 Resident Fellow, Center in Political Economy, Washington University
1970-86 Assistant to Full Professor of Political Science, Washington University
1978-86 Research Associate, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University
1969-70 Instructor of Political Science, University of Rochester

Administrative

2004-05 University Task Force on Construction, Harvard University
2002-03 Member, Provost's Committee on Housing, Harvard University
2000-01 Member, University Physical Planning Committee, Harvard University
2000- Member, Standing Committee on Political Economy and Government (PEG) Program,
Harvard University (Chair, 2003-05)
1999-2005 Member, Division on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (DBASSE),
National Research Council of the National Academies of Science
1998- Executive Committee, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences (now Institute for
Quantitative Social Science), Harvard University
1997-05 Chair, Faculty Planning Committee, Center for Government and International Studies
(CGIS), Harvard University
1995-98 Chair, Department of Government, Harvard University
1983-84 Chair, Committee on Political Economy, Washington University

TEACHING INTERESTS

Political Economy
Political Institutions
Positive Political Theory and Game Theory in Politics
Congressional and Parliamentary Politics

PUBLICATIONS

A. BOOKS

(with Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg) *American Government*, 7th (full and core) edition (New York: Norton, 2002), 8th (full and core) edition (New York: Norton, 2004), 9th (full and core) edition (New York: Norton, 2006)

(with Mark Bonchek) *Analyzing Politics* (New York: Norton, 1997)

(with Michael Laver) *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [Winner of William H. Riker Book Award, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association, 1998]

(Co-editor with Barry Weingast) *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) [originally a special issue of *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 19 (1994)]

(Co-editor with Michael Laver) *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition, a volume in *Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics*, Jacques Lesourne and Hugo Sonnenshein, eds. (London: Harwood Press, 1991).

(Co-Editor with James Alt) *Perspectives on Postive Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

(Co-Editor with Peter Ordeshook) *Political Equilibrium* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982).

(Editor) *The Congressional Budget Process: Some Views From the Inside* (St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, 1980).

The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

(with Alvin Rabushka) *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1972).

Series editor, *New Institutionalism in American Politics*, W.W. Norton, 2000 - .

B. ARTICLES

2007 (with Gary W. Cox) "Majority Cycling and Agenda Manipulation: Richard McKelvey's Contributions and Legacy" in John Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia, eds., *A Positive Change in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard McKelvey's Most Influential Writings* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).

"Courts, Models, and the New Institutionalism" In J. Bond, R. Flemming, and J. Rogers, eds., *Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press).

2006 "Commentary on L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik's 'A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,'" *American Political Science Review* 100: 680-81.

- “Arguments about Theory...Again,” Special Symposium on “Universal vs. Middle-Range Theory,” *CP-APSA* 17 (Summer 2006): 18-21.
- “Rational Choice Institutionalism” in S. Binder, R. Rhodes, and B. Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 23-39.
- “Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited” in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1031-50.
- 2004 Review of David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds., *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress* in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 34 (Winter 2004): 472-474.
- 2003 “Jigsaw Puzzle Redux.” *Extension of Remarks* 26 (July 2003): 28-31 [concluding response to a symposium on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*]
- “Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become Winners): William Riker’s Heresthetic.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1: 307-315.
- Review of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Predicting Politics* (Ohio State, 2002) in *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Summer 2003): 324-326.
- 2002 “Assessing Comparative Legislative Research.” In G. Loewenberg, P. Squire, and R. Kiewiet (eds.) *Legislatures* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 387-399.
- 2001 (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita) “Memoir for William H. Riker.” Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences.
- (with Eric Dickson) “Working and Shirking: Equilibrium in Public Goods Games with Overlapping Generations of Players.” *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* 17: 285-318.
- “A Comment on Institutional Change.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13: 321-325.
- 2000 (with Michael Laver) “Ministrables and Government Formation: Munchkins, Players, and Big Beasts of the Jungle.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12: 113-124.
- (with John Aldrich) “Explaining Institutional Change: Soaking, Poking, and Modeling in the U. S. Congress.” In William Bianco (ed.) *Congress on Display, Congress at Work* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 23-47.
- 1999 “The Political Economy of State Reform.” *Revista De Economia Politica [Brazilian Journal of Political Economy]* 19: 39-58.
- (with Michael Laver) “How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments.” In Shaun Bowler and David Farrell (eds.), *Party Organization* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), pp. 23-48.
- “Game Theory, Structure, and Sequence: The Contributions of Reinhard Selten to Political Analysis.” In James Alt, Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom (eds.), *Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science* (New York: Russell Sage), 256-273.
- (with Michael Laver) “Government Formation and Survival: A Rejoinder to Warwick’s Reply.” *British Journal of Political Science* 29: 412-415.

- (with Michael Laver) "Understanding Government Survival: Empirical Exploration or Analytical Models?" *British Journal of Political Science* 29: 395-401.
- (with Michael Laver) "Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy," in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Pierre Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 279-297.
- 1998 (with Michael Laver) "Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival," *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 28-55.
- (with James Alt) "Rules, Restrictions, Constraints: Structure and Process in the New Institutional Economics." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 154: 735-44.
- 1997 (with Robert H. Bates) "Intertemporal Institutions," in John V.C. Nye and John N. Drobak, eds., *Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics* (New York: Academic Press), pp. 197-211.
- 1996 (with Junko Kato and Michael Laver) "Portfolio Allocation and Government Formation in Europe and Japan," *Leviathan* 19: 63-86.
- (with Michael Laver), "Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation," in Norman Schofield, ed., *Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy* (Boston: Kluwer), pp. 295-315.
- 1995 "Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory," *Critical Review* 9: 213-223. [Reprinted in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., *The Rational Choice Controversy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 213-223.
- (with Barry Weingast) "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." In Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (eds.) *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp.5-37.
- "Political Deals in Institutional Settings," in Robert E. Goodin and H. Geoffrey Brennan, eds., *The Theory of Institutional Design* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- (with Kenneth Benoit) "Electoral Systems and Minority Representation," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., *Classifying by Race* (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Pp. 50-84.
- 1994 (with Barry Weingast) "The Future of Comparative Politics: Theory and Area Study," *APSA-CP* 5: 4, 30.
- (with Michael Laver) "Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government: A Research Agenda," in Ian Budge and David McKay, eds., *Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in Honor of JFP Blondel* (London: Sage).
- (with Barry R. Weingast) "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19: 149-179
- (with Miriam R. Jorgensen) "A Comment on the Positive Canons Project," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 57: 43-50.
- 1993 (with Michael Laver) "Agenda Formation and Cabinet Government," in William H. Riker, ed., *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 169-183.

- (with Michael Laver), "A Theory of Minority Government in Parliamentary Democracy," in Fritz Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Boulder: Westview), pp. 429-447.
- 1992 "Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as Oxymoron," *International Journal of Law and Economics* 12: 239-257. Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, ed., *Public Choice and Public Law* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007).
- "Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 8: 111-118.
- (with Michael Laver) "Election Results and Coalition Possibilities in Ireland," *Irish Political Studies* 7: 57-72.
- 1991 "Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment," in Pierre Bordieu and James Coleman, eds., *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (New York: Russell Sage), pp. 245-263. [Reprinted as "Discrecionalidad, instituciones y el problema del compromiso del gobierno" in Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommoassi (eds.), *La Nueva Economia Politica* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998), pp. 113-138.]
- (with Michael Laver) "Divided Government: America is Not 'Exceptional'." *Governance* 4: 250-269.
- 1990 (with Barry Nalebuff) "The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6: 45-72.
- (with Morris Fiorina) "Negative Voting: An Explanation Based on Principal-Agent Theory," in John Ferejohn and James Kuklinski, eds., *Information and Democratic Processes* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press): 124-136.
- (with Ronald Cohen) "Multiparty Competition, Entry and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections," in James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, eds., *Readings in the Spatial Theory of Voting* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 12-45.
- (with Michael Laver) "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *American Political Science Review* 84: 873-890.
- (with Michael Laver) "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics," *British Journal of Political Science* 20: 489-507.
- 1989 "The Changing Textbook Congress," in John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington: Brookings Institution), pp. 238-267.
- (with Murray Horn) "Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs," *Virginia Law Review* 75: 499-508.
- (with Morris Fiorina) "Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda-Setters, and Entrepreneurs," in Bryan D. Jones, ed., *Political Leadership from Political Science Perspectives* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), pp. 17-41.
- (with Morris Fiorina) "Negative Voting: Is It an Artifact?" *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 423-439.

- (with Gerald Gamm) "The Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and the Senate, 1810-1825," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14: 39-66. [Reprinted in Silbey *et.al.* *The Congress of the United States* (New York: Carlson, 1994)].
- "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1: 131-149. Reprinted in Dryzek, John, James Farr and Stephen Leonard, eds., *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 276-296. Reprinted in Peters, B. Guy and Jon Pierre, eds., *Institutionalism* (London: Sage, 2007).
- (with Barry Weingast) "Penultimate Power: Conference Committees in the Legislative Process," in Morris Fiorina and David Rohde, eds., *Home Style, Washington Work* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 199-219.
- 1988 "Macroeconomics and Politics: A Political Scientist's Views," in Stanley Fischer, ed., *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* (Cambridge: MIT Press), pp. 57-62.
- "Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Tradeoff," *Political Science Quarterly* 103: 461-485. [Reprinted in Alan Ware (ed.), *The United States of America*, vol III (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996)]
- "Thomas Schwartz's 'The Logic of Collective Choice': A Review Essay," *Economics and Philosophy* 3: 183-189.
- 1987 (with Barry Weingast) "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review* 81: 85-105. [Reprinted in: Charles K. Rowley, ed., *Public Choice Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993); Phillip Norton, ed., *Encyclopedia of Legislatures and Legislators* (London: Ashgate, 1997)].
- (with Joseph Greenberg) "The Effects of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry," *American Political Science Review* 81: 525-538
- (with Barry Weingast) "Reflections on Committee Power," *American Political Science Review* 81: 935-945.
- (with David W. Rohde) "Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government*," *Congress and the Presidency* 14: 111-133.
- 1986 "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert Weisberg (ed.), *The Science of Politics* (New York: Agathon), pp. 51-82.
- "The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Models," *Public Choice* 50 (Carnegie Papers in Political Economy): 135-179.
- (with Herbert Simon *et. al.*) "Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving," in *Research Briefings 1986 for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation, and Selected Federal Departments and Agencies* (Washington: National Academy Press). Reprinted in *Interfaces* 17 (1987): 11-31.
- 1985 "The Future Prospects of Formal Models of Legislatures," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10: 5-20.
- "Comment of Why the Regulators Chose to Deregulate," in Roger Noll (ed.), *Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 231-39.

- (with Barry Weingast) "Policy Consequences of Government by Congressional Subcommittees," in C. Lowell Harriss (ed.), *Control of Federal Spending* (New York: Academy of Political Science): 114-31.
- (with Arthur Denzau and William Riker), "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style," *American Political Science Review* 79: 1117-35.
- "Strategy, Structure and Procedure in Legislatures," (Abstract) *Mathematical Social Science* 10: 283.
- 1984 (with Barry Weingast) "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions," *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 49-75.
- (with Barry Weingast) "When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?" *Journal of Politics* 46: 206-21.
- (with Barry Weingast) "Political 'Solutions' to Market Problems," *American Political Science Review* 77: 417-34. Reprinted in Andrew Levine, ed., *The State and Its Critics*, vol. I (Cheltenham: Edwin Elgar Publishing Ltd.), pp. 357-376.
- (with Barry Weingast) "Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes," in Gregory Mills and John Palmer (eds.), *Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s* (Washington: Urban Institute Press): 343-68.
- "The Congressional Budget Process: Diagnosis, Prescription, Prognosis," in W. Thomas Wander, F. Ted Hebert and Gary W. Copeland (eds.), *Congressional Budgeting: Politics, Process, and Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 190-217.
- 1983 "Overgrazing the Budgetary Commons: Incentive- Compatible Solutions to the Problem of Deficits," in Laurence Meyer (ed.), *The Economic Consequences of Government Deficits* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff): 211-20.
- (with Peter Aranson) "The Compensation of Public Officials as a Campaign Issue: An Economic Analysis of *Brown v. Hartlage*," *Supreme Court Economic Review* 2: 213-276.
- 1982 (with Morris Fiorina) "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics," in Peter Ordeshook and Kenneth Shepsle (eds.) *Political Equilibrium* (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff): 49-64.
- "James Q. Wilson's *The Politics of Regulation: A Review Essay*," *Journal of Political Economy* 90: 216-21.
- (with Barry Weingast) "Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications," *American Economic Review* 78: 367-72.
- 1981 (with Barry Weingast) "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 96-112.
- (with Robert Salisbury) "Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind," *American Political Science Review* 75: 381-97. Reprinted in Silbey *et.al.* *The Congress of the United States* (New York: Carlson, forthcoming).
- (with Barry Weingast and Christopher Johnsen) "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," *Journal of Political Economy* 89: 642-65;

reprinted in Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds., *Monetary and Fiscal Policy Volume 2: Politics* (Cambridge: MIT Press), pp. 343-368.

(with Robert Salisbury) "Congressman as Enterprise," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6: 559-76. Reprinted in Robert Salisbury, ed., *Interests and Institutions* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992); reprinted in Randall B. Ripley and Elliot E. Slotnick, eds., *Readings in American Government and Politics*, 2nd ed. (Brooks-Cole, 1993).

(with Barry Weingast) "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," *Public Choice* 37: 503-519. Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley, ed., *Public Choice Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993). Reprinted in Professor Claude Ménard (ed.), *THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS* (Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004).

1980 "Economic Growth and National Energy Policy: Some Political Facts of Life," in Robert G. Sachs, ed., *National Energy Issues: How Do We Decide?* (Cambridge: Ballinger): 53-62, 306-08.

1979 "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23: 23-57. Reprinted in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., *Congress: Structure and Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 346-376.

"The Role of Institutional Structure in the Creation of Policy Equilibrium," in Douglas W. Rae and Theodore J. Eismeier, eds., *Public Policy and Public Choice*, Vol. 6 of Sage Yearbook in Politics and Public Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage): 249-83.

1978 "Risk and the Discount Rate for Investments Yielding Public Goods: The Arrow-Lind Theorem Reconsidered," in Gordon Tullock and Richard Wagner, eds., *Formal Models and Policy Analysis* (Boston: Lexington): 167-79.

(with David Rohde) "Thinking About Legislative Reform," in Leroy Rieselbach, ed., *Legislative Reform* (Boston: Lexington): 9-23.

"Official Errors and Official Liability," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 42: 35-45.

1977 "The Discount Rate for Public Investments: Should the Government Really Be Different?" *Policy Studies Journal* 5: 332-40.

(with David Rohde) "Membership Turnover and Congressional Reform: The More Things Change, the More They May or May Not Stay the Same," *Policy Studies Journal* 5: 469-76.

1975 "Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints," *Public Choice* 21: 55-78.

1974 "Theories of Collective Choice," in Cornelius Cotter et. al. (eds.) *Political Science Annual, V: Collective Decision Making* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill): 3-87.

"On the Size of Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review* 68: 505-18.

"Minimum Winning Coalitions Reconsidered," *American Political Science Review* 68: 522-24.

1973 (with David W. Rohde) "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process," *American Political Science Review* 67: 889-905. Reprinted in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of*

Representatives, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Harper and Row, 1977): 295-323; 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 79-108. Reprinted in Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., *Congress: Structure and Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 179-207.

1972 "The Paradox of Voting and Uncertainty," in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., *Probability Models of Collective Decision-Making* (Columbus: Charles Merrill): 252-70.

"Parties, Voters, and the Risk Environment: A Mathematical Treatment of Electoral Competition Under Uncertainty," in *Ibid.*, 273-97.

"The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review* 66: 555-69.

1971 (with Alvin Rabushka) "Political Entrepreneurship and Patterns of Democratic Instability in Plural Society," *Race* 12: 461-476.

1970 "A Note of Zeckhauser's 'Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives': A Case of the Paradox of Voting," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84: 705-710.

C. MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS

(with Robert Salisbury) "Understanding the Role and Impact of Congressional Staff," *Staff 2* (Washington: House Select Committee on Congressional Operations, 96th Congress, 1979).

"The Private Use of the Public Interest," *Society* 17 (May/June 1980): 35-42.

"William H. Riker: A Brief Intellectual History of the President-Elect," *P.S.* (Winter 1982): 80-84.

"The Budget: Will a Constitutional Amendment Help?" *Challenge* 25 (July/August 1982): 53-57.

"The Failure of Congressional Budgeting," *Society* 20 (May/June 1983): 4-11.

(with Clifford Hardin and Barry Weingast) "Government by Subcommittees," *Wall Street Journal* (June 24, 1983): 16.

"The Nature of Contemporary Political Science," *P.S.* (March, 1990): 40-42.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. GRANTS

NSF grant, "Uncertainty in Electoral Competition and Social Choice," 1972-73.

Carthage Foundation grant, "Impact of Legislative Rules and Procedures on Policy Decisions," 1976-77.

(with Robert Salisbury) Olin Foundation grant, "Research on the Policy Impact of Congressional Staff," 1977-79.

(with Barry Weingast) NSF grant, "Political Economy of the Pork Barrel," 1981-83.

(with Barry Weingast) NSF grant, "Political Institutions and Political Economy," 1983-86.

(with Brian Humes) Dirksen Center grant, "Origins of the Committee System," 1986-87.

NSF grant, "Rational Theories of Political Institutions," 1987-90.

(with James Alt and Morris Fiorina) Mellon Foundation Faculty Award, "Research and Teaching Program in Political Economy," 1987-90.

(with James Alt, Morris Fiorina, Peter Hall, Stanley Hoffman, and Robert Keohane) Ford Foundation Award for Undergraduate Teaching Program in Political Economy, 1989-1992.

(with Michael Laver) NSF grant, "The Theory of Government Coalitions," 1990-92.

(with James Alt et.al.) Research Training Grant, NSF, \$1.4 million, 1992-97.

(with Michael Laver) Research & Development Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, "Government Formation Project," 1992-1994.

(with Michael Laver) Research & Development Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, "Extensions to Government Formation Project," 1995-1996, 1996-97.

NSF grant, "Intertemporal Politics, 1999-2002.

Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Faculty Grant, 2001-02.

(with Jeffrey Frieden) NSF grant, "Political Institutions and Economic Policy," 2002-04.

National Institute of Aging (NIH) grant, "Seniority and Aging," 2004-2009.

B. FELLOWSHIPS, PRIZES, HONORS

Fellow, National Fellows Program, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1974-75.

Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, 1983-84.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 1984-85.

Fellow, National Academy of Sciences, 1990- .

Fellow, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1990- .

Fellow, Villa Serbelloni, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio, Italy, 1992.

George Kirby Distinguished Visiting Professor, TexasA&M University, May 1990.

Centennial Professor, London School of Economics & Political Science, 1998-99.

STICERD Distinguished Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics & Political Science, 2003-06.

Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, 2005, 2006.

(with Barry Weingast) Duncan Black Prize for Best Paper in *Public Choice*, Public Choice Society, 1982.

(with Barry Weingast) Heinz Eulau Prize for Best Paper in *APSR*, American Political Science Association, 1988.

Rochester Distinguished Scholar, 1992 (awarded by the Graduate School of Arts & Science, University of Rochester).

(with Michael Laver) APSA Political Economy Section Book Award for *Making and Breaking Governments*, 1997.

C. INVITED LECTURES AND SEMINARS

"The Politics and Economics of Committee Assignments in the U.S. House of Representatives," Hoover Institution, 1974; California Institute of Technology, 1975; Occidental College, 1975; Public Choice Center, VPI&SU, 1975; APSR Editorial Interns, Berkeley, 1975.

"The Future of Public Choice: A Political Scientist's Views," Banquet Address, Public Choice Society, New Orleans, 1977.

"Economic Growth and National Energy Policy: Some Political Facts of Life," Argonne National Laboratory, 1978.

"The Role and Impact of Congressional Staff," Library of Congress Staff Seminar, Washington, 1978.

"Geography and Jurisdiction: Impediments to a Prudent Congressional Fiscal Policy," Manville Lecture, University of Rochester, 1982.

"Strategy, Structure and Procedure," Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1982; Rice University, 1984; University of Texas, 1984; University of Iowa, 1984; Michigan State University, 1984; University of Chicago, 1984.

"Strategy and Structure in Legislatures," Jacob Marschak Symposium Lecture, UCLA, 1985.

"Penultimate Power: Conference Committees and the Legislative Process," Conference in Honor of Richard Fenno, 1986; Yale University Law School, 1987; Holy Cross College, 1987; Dartmouth College, 1987; MIT, 1987; Penn, 1987; Harvard, 1987; Harvard Law School, 1988; Stanford Law School, 1989.

"Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Tradeoff," Constitutional Bicentennial Lecture, Dartmouth College, 1987.

"The Theory of Government Coalitions," Hoover Institution, 1989; Washington University, 1989; George Mason University, 1990; University of Illinois, 1990; Texas A&M University, 1990; UCLA, 1990; UCSD, 1990; Duke University, 1991; University of North Carolina, 1991; Central Intelligence Agency, 1991.

"The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups," Yale Law School, 1990; Texas A&M University, 1990.

"Agenda Formation and Cabinet Government," University of Rochester, 1991.

"Making and Breaking Governments," Columbia University, 1992; Princeton University, 1992; Australia National University, 1992; Central Intelligence Agency, 1993; George Mason University, 1994; Harvard University, 1994; Carnegie-Mellon University, 1994; Boston University Law School, 1994; University of California, Berkeley, 1994.

Ida Beam Lectures, University of Iowa, 1994.

(with Robert Bates) "Demographics and Institutions: A paper in honor of Nobel Laureate Douglass North," Washington University, 1995.

"Thinking about Similarities in Politics," Thomas Eliot Lecture, Washington University, 1995.

"Testing a Theory of Government Formation," Columbia University, 1995.

Political Economy Lectures, Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory, 1996.

Political Economy Lectures, Tel Aviv University, 1997.

"Intertemporal Institutions," Inaugural William C. Mitchell Lecture, University of Oregon, 1997.

"The Political Economy of State Reform," Colombian National Planning Department, Bogota, Colombia, 1998.

"Reforming the State – Political to the Core," London School of Economics Public Lecture, February 1999.

Lectures on Overlapping Generations Approaches to Politics. Liberty Fund Seminar, Park City, Utah, 1999; ITAM, Mexico City, 2000.

George S. Parthemos Lecture, University of Georgia, 2001.

"Political Losers," Inaugural William H. Riker Lecture, Public Choice Society, 2002.

"Some Peculiarities about the US Senate," Harvard Club of Sarasota, FL, 2002.

"Advising and Consenting in the Sixty Vote Senate," Essex 2005, London School of Economics 2005, Stanford 2005, Turin 2005, Harvard 2005, Ohio State 2006, Chicago (Harris School) 2006, Northwestern (Kellogg School) 2006

"Information, Institutions, and Constitutional Arrangements," University of California, Berkeley 2006, Stanford 2006, Harvard 2006, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research 2006.

"Nominations for Sale," Harvard 2006

D. JOURNALS AND PUBLISHERS

International Advisory Board, *Political Studies*, 1999 - 2005.

Editorial Board, *Rationality and Society*, 1995 - .

Board of Editors, Economic Series, Texas A&M Press, 1995 - .

Editorial Advisory Board, *Encyclopedia of the United States Congress*, 1990- 1994.

Editorial Board, *American Political Science Review*, 1989-1992.

Editorial Board, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 1988-1991, 2000 - 2005.

Co-Editor, *Economics and Politics*, 1988-1991.

Editorial Board, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1987-.

Board of Editors, Cambridge University Press Series on the Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, 1986-.

Editorial Board, *Economic Inquiry*, 1985-88.

Editorial Board, *Journal of Politics*, 1982-88.

Editorial Board, *American Journal of Political Science* 1972-75, 1980-82, 1985-1991.

Editor (1975-80) and Editorial Board (1972-75; 1990-), *Public Choice*.

E. CONSULTING AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

APSA Liaison to Directorate of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (DBSSE), National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, 2005-

Committee of Visitors, Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES), National Science Foundation, 2004.

Advisory Committee, Economic Growth and Institutions Program, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, 2003 - .

Member, Directorate of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (DBSSE), National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, 1999-2005.

Co-organizer, Meetings of Research Group on Political Institutions and Economic Policy (PIEP), Harvard University, twice yearly, 1999 - .

Juror, Harrison Prize for best paper in *Political Studies*, 2001.

Consultant, World Bank, 1996, 1997

Advisory Board, Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University 1997-2005.

Governing Board, Section on Political Economy, American Political Science Association, 1994-95.

Vice President, American Political Science Association, 1992-93.

Advisory Council, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1991-1999.

Acting Director, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard University, 1987-88.

Council, APSA, 1985-87 (Administrative Committee, 1986; Membership Committee, Chair, 1987).

Working Group on Collective Choice Institutions, National Research Council, 1985.

Nomination Committee, APSA, 1983-85.

NSF Regulation Program Oversight Committee, 1983.

Program Committee, 1982 APSA National Meeting.

NSF Political Science Panel, 1980-82.

Director, Public Choice Workshop, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1978-86.

ABC News Political Unit, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982 National Elections.

Duncan Black Prize Award Committee, Public Choice Society, 1975-80, 1984, 1991.

Coordinator, Conference on Political Equilibrium in Honor of William H. Riker, 1980.

Coordinator, MSSB Workshop on Uncertainty and Political Processes, August, 1974.